6

Is There a Center to Hold?

The Problem of Transition in Post-Qaddafi Libya

ASIF MAJID

After accepting responsibility—but not culpability—for the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Muammar Qaddafi was received back into the international community in 2003. Libya paid compensation to the families of the 270 victims of the bombing, and sanctions were lifted against Libya as diplomatic relations were restored. Libya "bought peace," and the West was assured of open access to oil.[1] Fewer than ten years later, Qaddafi was overthrown in an uprising that received vast military support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Found hiding in a drain, Qaddafi was assaulted and then killed. His body was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere in the Libyan Desert.

Today, Libya is in disarray. Islamist militias have taken over the nation's capital and captured the international airport in Tripoli. The elected Libyan government has fled from Tripoli to Tobruk, a third-choice city given control of Benghazi by Islamist militias. The Tripoli-based Islamists have set up their own parliament, such that the country now exists with two parallel government structures. These competing centers of power agreed to hold UN-facilitated talks in late September 2014; soon thereafter, militias in Tripoli rejected calls for a cease-fire that emerged from the discussions. The outcome remains to be seen.

Clearly, Libya faces immense challenges. Politically motivated armed conflict between Islamists and secularists and their respective militias, as well as growing lawlessness, have contributed to increasing criminal violence. Foreign interests and a readiness to pursue them in Libya add extra layers of complexity to an

The author acknowledges the important contributions of Tyrone Savage to this chapter. He has provided a detailed, in situ understanding of the current dynamics in Libya. This text would not be in its current form without his assistance and support.

already convoluted transition, while armed groups benefiting from a flood of heavy weaponry compete for internal power. This begs the question: Whither Libya?

Legacies of Deep Division

Libya's divisions are not new. Colonialism, manipulation, and depravation induced by foreign powers have a long history in what is today known as Libya. The country is split into three historic regions: Tripolitania in the northwest, Fezzan in the southwest, and Cyrenaica in the east. Attempting to unite these regions into a single state was a slow process, the bulk of which took place in the period from 1942 to 1951. During this time, the French ruled Fezzan while the British ruled Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. After a tumultuous period of political indecision, the allied forces of World War II united the three regions into one country, which became independent in 1951. Idris al-Senussi, head of the Senussi Sufi order, was installed as king; he thanked his benefactors with gifts of land, influence, and oil (after its discovery in the late 1950s). Wealth remained concentrated in the uppermost echelons of Libyan society.

Enter Muammar Qaddafi. Inspired by a coup d'état in Egypt led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qaddafi and his fellow Free Officers executed a peaceful coup in 1969, establishing the Libyan Arab Republic. He consolidated his power through a cultural revolution in 1973—the Jamahiriya, or state of the masses—and proclaimed the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977. While this masqueraded as a form of direct democracy that was free of political parties and that reflected the country's tribal divisions, it gave Qaddafi near total control.[2] Qaddafi pitted tribes against one another, made the armed services subservient to his personal needs, and imprisoned or exiled those who opposed him. Based on his reading of the Qur'an, he rejected both capitalism and communism.[3] At the same time, he developed extravagant manifestations of his Bedouin roots as well as an initial vision of pan-Arab unity.

Despite Qaddafi's authoritarian rule, Libyan opposition could not be silenced. From the mid-1980s onward, Qaddafi made some political concessions by restraining the power of the revolutionary committees he had established. He also yielded to demands for reform in the economy and allowed for modest private trade under the direction of his son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, a process that further enriched the Tripoli-based elite.

Building on the December 2010 uprisings in Tunisia, Libyan opposition to Qaddafi intensified, leading to open rebellion in February 2011. Rebels received arms via ancient smuggling routes. In mid-March 2011, NATO initiated airstrikes to support the rebel cause. Qaddafi was killed in October 2011. The National

Transitional Council (NTC), the political face of the transition, gained international recognition before handing over power to the General National Congress (GNC) through elections in July 2012. Multiple civil society organizations emerged to take part in the political process upon Qaddafi's death. However, the collapse of Qaddafi's authoritarian state resulted in the disintegration of government institutions. This escalated distrust and suspicion between opposing groups as they fought to benefit from Qaddafi's demise.

Security became a major concern, leading the NTC and then the GNC to limit civil society activities. Armed groups proliferated, and attacks on both Libyan and international officials became commonplace. Though voices in Libya and beyond called for an inclusive national dialogue that reached across tribal, ideological, and class interests, such moderate viewpoints have been sidelined. At best, today Libya remains in a transition to a transition.

The Libyan Revolution

Dominant Arab Gulf States as well as the West, both of which played a major role in Qaddafi's exit, continue to be factors in the post-Qaddafi period. NATO and its allies underestimated the extent of Libyan sectarianism at the time of their 2011 intervention.

Opposition to Qaddafi's rule was deep-seated, resulting in everyday Libyan people in both urban and rural areas as well as organized rebel groups taking to the streets in 2011. Reports also indicate that the CIA and Britain's MI6 were involved in supporting the Libyan uprising.[4] Rebel groups also alleged that Qaddafi's troops had attacked unarmed civilians, which contributed to a situation that was interpreted as a justification for intervention. Alternate, nonviolent peace proposals forwarded by the International Crisis Group and the African Union (AU) called for negotiations and an immediate cease-fire, but leaders in Washington, Paris, and London brushed these aside.[5]

All of this contributed to Qaddafi's Libya becoming the latest victim in the Western tradition of eliminating unfriendly regimes around the world. NATO strikes and a no-fly zone were the order of the day, supported by Saudi Arabia and other powerful Gulf States. NATO's priority was regime change. Allegedly, this resulted in NATO pilots and strike commanders ignoring rebel requests for support in rural areas, preferring to focus their attention on the infrastructure on which Qaddafi depended to remain in power.

After Qaddafi was eliminated, direct military support was withdrawn and limited support for the reconstruction process was offered, leaving the NTC to deal with rebel forces. The West had learned its twenty-first-century lesson in interventionism the hard way in Iraq and was not about to repeat the mistake of a lengthy

and costly restoration process. In the words of historian Hugh Roberts, "shadow play" limited Western liability.[6]

Libya's developing political structures reflect the country's deep divisions and fractures that had been held together by Qaddafi's strong hand; these fissures were not taken into account. NATO bombs were insufficient to establish a friendly regime in Libya or to create a context within which former enemies could develop a reconstructive environment. This placed the NTC and GNC in a power vacuum, the very situation that the AU's peace proposal sought to avoid.[7]

These circumstances serve Western elites and wealthy Gulf States in economic terms. With Qaddafi gone and the GNC on its way to disarray, economic and political interest groups are free to manipulate the country. As is discussed below, foreign oil companies increase their influence on Libya's future through funding and other forms of support for a cash-strapped and dependent government.

All of this leads to a question: To what extent was Libya's uprising a foreign intervention rather than a national revolution? Indigenous rebel forces were and are an inherent part of the continuing unrest in Libya, while the manipulation of the original uprising by outside forces has opened the door for foreign powers to reap the benefits. Whether from NATO, foreign intelligence sources, or politicians in far-off cities, interventions to refashion Libya have conspired to make it dependent on NATO countries and their allies.

Struggling with Leadership in a Power Vacuum

Libya is finding it increasingly difficult to forge national independence in the face of foreign pressure and in a declining security situation. Armed groups align themselves with external and internal sources of funding, promoting tribal allegiances and vying with one another to secure the support of different elements of the Libyan government. Reports identify approximately seventeen hundred armed groups that range in size and experience.[8] These include revolutionary groups that fought against Qaddafi during the 2011 uprisings as well as others that broke away from local military councils during and after the civil war. Beyond these recognized brigades, multiple criminal networks and extremist groups also exist, in addition to mercenaries who were once employed as security forces by Qaddafi.[9] At the same time, there is evidence that many of these armed groups have established relations with foreign governments and private funders. A US defense official noted that "just because someone is in a militia doesn't mean they can't participate" in training that meets "NATO standards."[10] As they grow, armed groups are looking beyond Libya, an orientation that is likely to escalate conflict within the country.

Libya's patchwork of armed groups represents a multitude of interests. The United States and the European Union (EU) have supported the integration of

multiple brigades into Libya's government forces, while the wealthy Arab Gulf States and the United States have been involved in training Libyan government military recruits. Evidence points to the secular-leaning National Forces Alliance enjoying the support of Libya's Defense Ministry. Armed Islamist groups benefit from a closer relationship with private funders on the Arabian Peninsula via Libya's Interior Ministry, fueling the competition between Gulf and other Arab States in their quest to gain influence in Libya.

Complicating the situation is Operation Dignity, a military campaign launched by renegade general Khalifa Haftar in early 2014 with the stated aims of fighting terrorism and expelling Islamist extremists from the country. This resulted in early battles against Islamist militias in Benghazi, expanding to Tripoli by mid-2014. The GNC government insisted that Haftar had no authority to act, and the United States distanced itself from his actions. There is, however, evidence to indicate covert US support for Haftar, particularly in the form of aerial surveillance. Haftar, a one-time chief of staff in Libya's military, fell out of favor with Qaddafi and fled to the United States. Reports indicate that he underwent training with the CIA and acquired United States citizenship; he returned to Libya in 2011 to support the civil war.[11] Forces aligned with Operation Dignity stormed the GNC in May 2014 and pushed for its dissolution. Haftar has emerged as a military leader with significant support across the country. This backing includes disgruntled units of the Libyan security forces, the powerful Zintani militias from the Nafusa Mountains, councils of elders, and even the founder of the Islamist February 17 Brigade that Haftar's forces have been fighting in Benghazi.[12] Given Haftar's checkered history, he may well be an unacceptable leader to both Libyans and the international community. However, his rise to political visibility raises the question as to whether Libyans, NATO, and their allies will look for a strongman similar to Egypt's General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, a figure discussed in chapter 7.

Leadership developments in Egypt and their relevance to Libya are part of a contentious debate that begins with the Political Isolation Law (PIL), which prevents Qaddafi-era officials from holding public office until ten years have passed. Fear of the emergence of a Qaddafi-era leader has resulted in multiple postponements of a final decision on the constitutionality of the PIL, which was made law in May 2013.[13] Critics of the PIL see it as an instrument of partisan national revenge that reduces institutional and administrative capacity while failing to make allowances for Qaddafi-era officials who criticized the regime and contributed to its downfall. In light of the PIL, Haftar's position as a former member of the regime presents a significant question mark.

Libya's leadership parallels to Egypt are obvious but should not be exaggerated. Egypt is a key player in the politics of the Middle East. Libya's influence on regional and global politics is of a different kind. Libya is a gateway to Europe that enables illegal migration across the Mediterranean; former Qaddafi and rebel fighters have been drawn into military conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Sahel;

and the country offers an accessible supply of oil. Further, while President Sisi has significant support through Egypt's military, corporate, and administrative infrastructure, whoever grabs power in Libya will have to (re)build the state, almost from nothing.

Despite the tendency to reject anything Qaddafi-esque, there is a realization that his policies—although unequal in application—led to literacy rates of 88 percent, an annual per capita income of US$12,000 (the highest in Africa), relatively good education, and adequate health care. Qaddafi also provided development and military aid to other African nations; his support for Pan-Africanism resulted in his being seen and treated as a cult hero by many across the continent. All of this, both at home and elsewhere in Africa, was possible because Qaddafi controlled oil revenue and used it to bolster his own agenda at the cost of democratic processes and human rights. Certain questions emerge in relation to current events: What are those everyday people who benefited from Qaddafi's favor prepared to do, and whom are they prepared to support, in order to recover those benefits? Is the war-ravaged public willing to follow any populist leader who has the military and material backing to promise peace?

There is growing support for forces loyal to Haftar, leaders of Zintani militias, and other rebel groups that feed off popular anger regarding the lack of adequate social services while exploiting Libya's history of entrenched sectarianism. This paints a dismal picture within the existing power vacuum. While competing militia groups provide a semblance of security for different sections of society in a country that suffers from a chronic absence of law, order, and normalcy, most of these militias are accused of human rights abuses, unlawful detentions, and vigilante justice. Dangerously, this escalates Libya's civil war.

Social Identity

Today's social identity struggle in Libya is embedded in yesterday's malady of colonialism that manipulated existing precolonial divisions between tribes. Colonial powers governed each tribal group according to distinct customary law that was executed by "loyal" and favored native chiefs. African nationalists had similar practices, cementing their position in the postcolonial period through the promotion of their own specific tribal allegiances and the exclusion of others.

Ironically, these loyalties, which entrenched divisions both before the rule of King Idris and throughout the Qaddafi years, may offer a semblance of hope in the lawlessness that is Libya. The residual persistence of patriarchal tribal authority, albeit with weakened control, provides a sense of constancy in parts of the country, even where traditional values have been depleted; nonetheless, equal inclusion of women remains a challenge. In reality, many armed groups have their roots in these structures. A good deal may hinge on whether tribal leaders have

the will and capacity to reconcile with other tribal leaders and secular groups in the country. Effective leadership will need to appeal to communities steeped in tribal law and religion while at the same time accepting the agency of secular influences on government and business affairs.

In an attempt to reconcile the historic African tensions between tribal authorities and central government, Libya's original GNC was based on an electoral system that allowed for 64 constituency seats (for independent candidates only) and 136 seats for those nominated by political parties. However, the fact that 120 of the 200 seats in that GNC were held by independents—as opposed to the 64 seats designated for independents in the electoral law—suggests reluctance by political parties to include tribal leaders and hesitation by these leaders to engage in national politics. Evolving parliamentary formations, including the current iteration of the elected House of Representatives, furthers this historical tension.

Continuing contestation regarding the election of a prime minister is another indicator of ongoing instability in Libyan governance. In October 2013, a militia aligned with the Islamist-leaning Ministry of the Interior abducted Prime Minister Ali Zeidan; he was released the same day after Zintani and other militias intervened. Zeidan was ousted four months later. Abdullah al-Thinni was appointed caretaker prime minister, but he resigned from office after violence threatened his family. The GNC then appointed Ahmed Maiteeq as prime minister, but he was forced to resign after the selection was ruled unconstitutional. In June 2014, al-Thinni was returned to his former position. This means that post-Qaddafi Libya has changed prime ministers, on average, every five months. Each new figure has come via an alliance between numerous political parties, emerging from stormy and tumultuous conditions. GNC member Ahmed Langi highlighted this dynamism, calling for a "balanced cabinet team, consisting of members from Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Fezzan."[14] The political tensions between regional and central interests in Libya need to be overcome.

Questions abound. Will the legacy of the Qaddafi years—in which civil society was sidelined, if not silenced—return to Libya? Will the upsurge of civil society seen in the immediate aftermath of Qaddafi's departure take root and create a culture of democratic participation? Will the involvement of powerful foreign countries result in the establishment of a client state in Libya that, once again, fails to enjoy the support of its people? Will Islamist forces establish an emirate governed by Islamic law? Or will the separate regions, tribes, and ideologies of Libya, each with diverse needs and interests, coexist in some form of federal government?

History suggests that people denied their basic rights have a capacity to renew themselves as they pursue those rights. This is seen across the Afro-Arab *ecumene*: Liberian women brought about the end of civil war in their country in 2003 through sit-ins and sex strikes. Fambul Tok in Sierra Leone has incorporated tribal divisions into its reconciliatory processes. The garnering of over a million

votes in the South African national elections by the new Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party indicates restlessness among that country's poor. Popular protests continue to be a significant factor in Egyptian politics, while Tunisia, despite its progress in governance, continues to face demands for broader democratic inclusion. Demonstrations continue in other parts of Southwestern Asia and Africa. The list of successful civil society movements across Afro-Arab nations is long and growing.

Building a new Libyan state requires the integration of government, tribal, and other structures. Indeed, the involvement of elites from the West and Arab Gulf States, as well as other global powers, is likely to increase. Time is the greatest of teachers, and it is still too early to predict the outcome of developments in Libya. However, ineffective understanding of on-the-ground complexities could generate more violence in an already broken country.

Oil

Oil has long been seen as both a blessing and a curse for developing countries. In Libya, oil is a lure that can exacerbate the involvement of industrialized nations in the country's struggle to find a common center. Qaddafi's ousting has given rise to a new Libyan era, one twisted by international oil needs. Export figures from 2010 reflect that year's flow of Libyan oil: 27 percent to Italy, 16 percent to France, 10 percent to Spain, 10 percent to Germany, 5 percent to Greece, 4 percent to the United Kingdom, and 3 percent to the United States. With Europe and the United States receiving 75 percent of Libya's 2010 oil output, it could ill afford to leave their supplies dependent on the whims of Qaddafi, a man they dismissed as an impulsive dictator.[15] The Iraq war and its implications for the Arab Gulf States, as well as deteriorating relations between the European Union and Russia and increasing Chinese demands for oil, complicate matters further. International dependence on Libyan oil reflects one of the vested foreign interests that impacted Libya's past and continues to govern its future.

Just after the NATO strikes on Libya, oil production dropped at least 10 percent. Oil and gas, however, continued to be in high demand across the developing world. Saudi Arabia, the only country in the world with the capacity to turn production on and off at will, added over 150,000 barrels per day to global output almost overnight. Iraq played its part as well, contributing an additional 200,000 barrels per day during August 2013.[16]

By increasing world supplies, Saudi Arabian oil reported record profits in 2012. The big five oil companies (BP, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell) also reported massive profits nearing US$20 billion during the second quarter of 2013.[17] Furthermore, a recent report from the Kurdish magazine *Lvin* shows that well-placed retired generals and politicians—former British Prime Minister Tony

Blair apparently among them—are benefiting from the establishment of multiple oil contracts in Kurdish parts of Iraq.[18]

Threats by Ibrahim Saeed Jdharan—head of Cyrenaica's political bureau—regarding oil-rich Cyrenaica's intention to secede from the national state have important implications for both the country's level of oil production and its political stability. While the now Tobruk-based government seeks to restore war-damaged ports in Cyrenaica to ship oil from the multiple oil fields in the area, armed tribal groups with the capacity to sabotage national reconstruction and restoration processes are demanding a share of oil revenues.

This conflict between Tripoli and Cyrenaica is of particular importance to oil companies interested in Libya. The country's major pipelines, as well as a number of the most prominent oil fields, are in Cyrenaica. In addition, most of Libya's ports for shipping oil are in the Cyrenaica region. Oil companies are thus forced to renegotiate their relationship with multiple centers of influence in Libya, among them the Libyan government, Cyrenaica's political bureau, and rebel groups. Whatever the outcome of the Cyrenaican threat to secede, the involvement of oil companies in Libyan political developments is likely to increase in the future, as is the role of foreign states.

At the same time, there are other suitors such as Russia, some of the Arab Gulf States, and China. Each is competing for varying degrees of influence in Libya, particularly in terms of access to oil and the sale of military equipment. Other countries in North Africa, including Morocco and Algeria, are also keen to provide military support to the government and rebel groups in the country. In turn, Egypt under Sisi's rule may support a strong Libyan ruler who has the ability to impose law and order, regardless of the circumstances under which he may come to power. The intersection of external and internal trade factors will, most likely, make these countries important contestants in the struggle for political influence in Libya.

The Way Forward

Extended political and sectarian violence makes structured dialogue increasingly difficult, yet this may be the only alternative to further violence. To succeed, the ground rules for such a dialogue will need to involve a commitment to address all issues of accountability for past and present human rights violations, involving people engaged in all sides of the conflict.

This makes the issue of purging, embodied in the PIL, an increasingly contentious matter. A policy of excluding those affiliated with a past regime was adopted in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein. It escalated political conflict there, with the present disarray in Iraq indicating the importance of including all sections of a nation in any reconstruction program.[19] Though the PIL is a major

concern in this regard, Haftar's military operations and desire to rid Libya of any Islamist influence represent a more direct form of purging.

Qaddafi's rule resulted in serious repression—from the Ownership Law of 1978, which encouraged mass seizure of private property such as homes and businesses, to the infamous massacre at Abu Salim Prison. In 1996, 1,270 prisoners were killed at Abu Salim after they sought improved living conditions.[20] Families of the deceased have not received reparations or assistance from the state in dealing with their losses, nor have they obtained the basic information required for them to have a measure of closure in their lives. Any national dialogue process in Libya would have to consider these elements of Libya's past.

National dialogue is also required in order to handle questions of providing immunity to those responsible for the implementation of Qaddafi-era policies and to revolutionary brigades and rebel armies for crimes committed in the context of efforts to oust Qaddafi. Part of the problem with establishing a national dialogue is that there is no precedent for such conversation in Libya. Qaddafi's decentralization of power outlawed Libya's political parties, which resulted in the Libyan people's lack of familiarity with constructive national debate. Inclusive reconciliation, however, requires that the nation's multiple stakeholders engage one another regarding the most controversial issues facing the nation. This means that transitional justice structures in Libya will need to equip the country with checks and balances that facilitate an inherently difficult dialogue, a process that is growing more convoluted by the day. Whatever the underlying causes of Qaddafi's overthrow and the nature of external forces in the final demise of his regime, Libyans must find a method of coexistence if they are to build a post-Qaddafi state.

Including members of Qaddafi's regime, minority groups, tribal leaders, youth, and women in national conversation is an important step forward in this regard. However, the process of the elections in early 2014 for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) suggests that the participation of female candidates in the constitution-making process will be limited. As Lawyers for Justice in Libya articulated:

> Despite representing 49% of the population, women's participation is likely to be limited to the six reserved seats. Female representation in the constitution-drafting process is likely to be further hampered due to an asymmetrically implemented electoral system. As a result, only a few sub-constituencies will have separate lists for women candidates and many will, therefore, be left with no choice as to which women will represent them in the CDA. While women candidates could theoretically still be elected into the assembly via the general lists, this is unlikely to happen due to the limited number of female candidates on the general lists. The elections for the General National Council in 2012 also demonstrated that women candidates are currently unlikely to win seats through the general ballot.[21]

Change in Libya will require a level of political inclusion in the GNC that the broader Libyan political apparatus, at present, fails to reflect.

For a sustainable peace, Libyans must reach beyond the categories of those who supported and those who opposed Qaddafi's rule. Such a task demands a commitment to dialogue and national reconciliation as captured in the September 2013 report to the UN Security Council from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The report highlights the importance of tackling security concerns, recognizing interconnected foreign and domestic factors, addressing the challenge of internally displaced persons, disarming militia groups, building state institutions, and implementing transitional justice programs.[22]

A meaningful and comprehensive response by a broad cross section of Libyans to Ban Ki-moon's report could go a long way toward determining the country's future direction. In what the UN report refers to as a "stalled transition," the worst-case scenario for Libya could be either a foreign-dominated client state or a Somalia-like disintegration. Indeed, continuing uncertainty is today's only certainty.

Notes

1. BBC News, "Full Transcript: Libyan PM Interview."
2. Libyan tribes include: Major Libyan Tribes (Gadhadhfa, Warfalla, Magarha, Firjan, Hasawna, and Sweia); those found in the Cyrenaica Region (Al-Awagir, Al-Abaydat, Drasa, Al-Barasa, Al-Fawakhir, Al-Zuwayya, and Al-Majabra); those in the Tripolitania Region (Warfalla, Awlad Busayf, Al-Zintan, and Al-Rijban); those in the city of Sirte (Al-Qaddadfa, Al-Magarha, Al-Magharba, Al-Riyyah, Al-Haraba, Al-Zuwaid, and Al-Guwaid); and those in the Fezzan Region (Al-Hutman, Al-Hassawna, Toubou, and Tuareg).
3. Bruce St. John, *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*, 157–59.
4. Azikiwe, "CIA & MI6 in Libya: U.S.-British Covert Operations Exposed."
5. Roberts, "Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go?"
6. Ibid.
7. De Waal, "The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011."
8. BBC News, "Guide to Key Libyan Militias."
9. McQuinn, "After the Fall: Libya's Evolving Armed Groups."
10. Hauslohner and DeYoung, "U.S. Plan for New Libyan Force Faces Obstacles."
11. Lacher, "Libya's Transition: Towards Collapse."
12. el Gomati, "Khalifa Haftar: Fighting Terrorism or Pursuing Political Power?"
13. Amirah-Fernández, "Libya and the Problematic Political Isolation Law."
14. Abdallah, "Libya's New Prime Minister."
15. Energy Information Administration, "Libya."
16. Faucon and Said, "Saudi, U.S., Iraq Step in to Plug Libya Oil Gap."
17. Weiss and Weidman, "Big Oil Rakes in Huge Profits, Again."
18. McEwan, "Retired US Generals and Politicians Reaping Oil Profits from Iraq's Kurdistan."
19. Stover, Megally, and Mufti, "Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq."
20. Human Rights Watch, "Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison."

21. Lawyers for Justice in Libya, "LFJL Acknowledges the Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections."

22. Ban, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya."

Bibliography

Abdallah, Kamel. "Libya's New Prime Minister." *Al-Ahram Weekly*, May 8, 2014.

Amirah-Fernández, Haizam. "Libya and the Problematic Political Isolation Law." Real Instituto Elcano, June 20, 2013. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/mediterranean+arab+world/ari20-2013-amirah-fernandez-libia-ley-aislamiento-politico/.

Azikiwe, Abayomi. "CIA & MI6 in Libya: U.S.-British Covert Operations Exposed." International Action Center, April 7, 2011. www.iacenter.org/africa/libya-cia-m16-040911/.

Ban Ki-moon. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya." United Nations Security Council, S/2013/516, September 5, 2013. http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/UNSG%20Report%2005092013_EN.pdf.

BBC News. "Full Transcript: Libyan PM Interview." February 24, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3517101.stm.

———. "Guide to Key Libyan Militias." May 20, 2014. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19744533.

Bruce St. John, Robert. *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2012.

de Waal, Alex. "The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011." World Peace Foundation, December 19, 2012. http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/.

el Gomati, Anas. "Khalifa Haftar: Fighting Terrorism or Pursuing Political Power?" Al Jazeera English, June 10, 2014. www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/khalifa-hifter-operation-dignity-20146108259233889.html.

Energy Information Administration. "Libya." US Department of Energy, June 2012. http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/cabs/Libya/pdf.pdf.

Faucon, Benoît, and Summer Said. "Saudi, U.S., Iraq Step in to Plug Libya Oil Gap." *Wall Street Journal*, September 10, 2013.

Hauslohner, Abigail, and Karen DeYoung. "U.S. Plan for New Libyan Force Faces Obstacles." *Washington Post*, December 1, 2013.

Human Rights Watch. "Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison." June 27, 2006. www.hrw.org/news/2006/06/27/libya-june-1996-killings-abu-salim-prison.

Lacher, Wolfram. "Libya's Transition: Towards Collapse." *SWP Comments* (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), no. 25 (May 2014). www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C25_lac.pdf.

Lawyers for Justice in Libya. "LFJL Acknowledges the Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections." July 18, 2013. www.libyanjustice.org/news/news/post/98-lfjl-welcomes-start-of-constitutional-process-calls-for-more-representation-and-public-engagement.

Mamdani, Mahmood. "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (October 2001): 651–64.

McEwan, Dale. "Retired US Generals and Politicians Reaping Oil Profits from Iraq's Kurdistan." *PressTV*, June 8, 2013. www.presstv.com/detail/2013/06/08/307889/retired-us-generals-and-politicians-reaping-oil-profits-from-iraqs-kurdistan/.

McQuinn, Brian. "After the Fall: Libya's Evolving Armed Groups." Small Arms Survey, Working Paper 12, October 2012. www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP12-After-the-Fall-Libya.pdf.

Roberts, Hugh. "Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go?" *London Review of Books* 33, no. 22 (November 17, 2011).

Sharqieh, Ibrahim. "Reconstructing Libya: Stability through National Reconciliation." *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, 2013. www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/12/03-libya-national-reconciliation-sharqieh.

Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti. "Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq." *Human Rights Quarterly* 27 (January 2005): 830–857.

Weiss, Daniel J., and Jackie Weidman. "Big Oil Rakes in Huge Profits, Again." Center for American Progress, August 2, 2013. www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2013/08/02/71386/big-oil-rakes-in-huge-profits-again/.

This page intentionally left blank